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Unlike the United States where officials of吐ieState Department were 
subjected by the Senate to postwar Congressional investigation恒也e
Pearl-Harbour hearing, Bntish Far Eastern policy-makers were saved such 
parbamentary ordeals The loss of the whole British position m the Far 
East at the hands of the Japanese between December 1941 and May 
1942 was humiliating en叩悼 Itwas, as Winston Churchill later claimed, 
“世田worstd1岨sterand the largest capitulation of Bntish history."121 
Wi白白epublication of Dr. Peter Lowe’s monograph:" historians can 
now claun to have a fauly well-documented chronology of Britain’s 
policy in the F.ar East during the crucial period, 1937-41. Lowe’s m吋or
preoccupation in his book 1s to answer two important but rela臼dques-
lions: Was Britam responsible to some extent for the outbreak of the 
war? Could the war have been avoided? He adduces a wealth of evi-
dence to prove曲目白oughthe responsibility for beginning the Pacific 
war was chiefly由atof Japan, the British and American responsibility 
was unwittingly to en叩回世iatthe war started on 7 December 1941, 
rather than at some date in 1942'.41 But one reads I』we’sbook m vain for 
an answer to his second and perhaps more unportant question. This is 
because Peter Lowe fails to go卸toSir Robert Craigie’s fmal report on 
his rniss10n to Japan to吐ieForeign Office -a report of great historical 
signi白C阻 ce,in which he argued forcefully也at世田warcould have been 
avoided altogether. 
Like Sir Neville Henderson's mission to Ber泊LCraigie’s to Tokyo 
ended m failure. For出sfailure, he later, man unportant document he 
sent to Anthony Eden on 4 February 1943, blamed the Foreign Office 
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for refusmg to come to terms with the Japanese moderates. Craigie 
firmly believed that war between Britain and Japan was not inevitable, 
because he held that unlike Germany, Jap阻 wasnot a totalitarian state, 
and felt convinced血atmoderate opmion was important m Japan. Thus, 
he concluded that if吐ieBritish Goverrunent had courted the moderates 
who were opposed to war with the Western Powers，也emilitarists would 
not have been able to drive Japan into war In short, Craigie blamed the 
anti-Japanese bias in血eForeign Office whlch he thought had militated 
agamst Brit血1prop1tiatmg Japan But more 1mportantiy, he thought 
that there was叩 opportunityfor averting出ePacific war when the 
Japanese, durmg their conversation with the Americans m 1941, put for-
ward a compronuse formula on 20 November, which would have re-
moved Japanese troops from sou也emIndo China, and freed Malaya, 
Burma and the Dutch East Indies from the threat which they posed 15 
In essence, Craigie thought the Pacific war could have been avoided. 
The Far Eastern Department of the Foreign Office whose officials 
such as Charles Orde, Nigel Ronald, Robert Howe, John Sterndale 
Bennett, Esler Dening and Sir George Sansom -exercised considerable 
mfluence on the mal<ing of Britain’S Far Eastern policy, disagreed with 
Craigie’s thesis'." These officials seem to belong to the school of thought 
which holds that war between the Democracies and Japan was inevitable, 
血atwar could only be averted if Bntain had been willing to abandon her 
great position in the Far East, or alternatively, if Japan had voluntarily 
abandoned the policy which, from modest beginnings, grew into吐田
“New Order m Greater East Asia ”But the possibilities of both gradual 
adjustment, according to the Far Eastern Department, were found to be 
ilusory'." In short, they did not see the chauv1mstic and mtlitarisl!c 
features in Japanese policy in the 1930’s asan aberration, rather it was a 
master-plan which had started to unfold itself since 1931 and which re-
quired a decisive blow from the West at that critical moment in 1941. 
Thus, there was a fatalistic belief in the inevitability of war between 
Japan and the Democracies恒也eF ore1gn Office 
The p町 oseof出 spaper is to put Craigie’s report in its historical 
perspective by analysing the conception or m!Sconception, perception or 
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misperception, of the Far Eastern situation by Sir Robert Craigie and世田
Foreign Office during the crucial period, 1937 to 1941. Indeed, Craigie’s 
final report to the F ore1gn O節目m1943 is seen as the culmination of an 
attitude which、hehad assumed even before he became the British Am-
bassador to Japan m 1937 It 1s hoped that, by concentratmg on major 
policy disagreements between Sir Robert Craigie and the Foreign Office 
between 1937 and 1941, this study would make an important contribu-
tion to knowledge since it would highlight the differences of opinion be司
tween Craigre and世田 ForeignOffice on the inevitability of war between 
Japan and Great Britam. Thus, 1t would help to provide an answer to 
Dr. Lowe’s second question Could the war have been avoided? 
Sir Robert Craigie arrived in Tokyo on 3 September 1937 in a Cana-
dian Pacific Liner, Empress of Russ.臼，toas四meduty as Bntish Ambas-
sador to Japan. Craigie was not new in Tokyo in 1937. He knew Japan 
well He first v1s1ted the country when he was seven years old, and con-
stantly went to Japan during the summer holidays as a student. Durmg 
吐tisimpressionistic period of his life, certain Japanese characteristics 
were indelibly registered in his mmd He considered them “courteous 
and considerate people."181 
These impressions never deserted him in his adult life, when he 
became the British Ambassador to Japan in September 1937. They were 
to aid the development of his pro-Japanese feelings during the crucial 
period from 1937 to 1941. On the eve of his appointment as世田British
Ambassador to Japan, Craigie was higl叫yop tin由ticthat Britain and 
Japan would come to terms. There were two reasons for tltis belief: he 
seemed to pnt much hope in the discussions which had been proceed血g
in London since 1936 between the Japanese Ambassador to l』ndon,
Yositida Shigeru, and the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden. He 
had thought白atthese conv，町田tionswould lead to better Anglo-Japanese 
relations He also believed that the Japanese Government of廿iet加e,
particularly after the appomtment of Sato Naotake as Foreign Secretary, 
was moderate and Anglophil, and would like to pnt relat10ns with Bntain 
on a better footing~＂ But as I have pointed out elsewhere, the interests 
of Japan and Bntam concerning China were fundamentally irrecon-
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cilable；泊deedthe outbreak of the Sino-Japanese conflict in July 1937 
made阻pprochementbetween the two countn田泊中0田ible~＇
C四igienever despaired; he was determined to understand the prob-
!ems facing Japan and to seek ways of improving Anglo-Japanese 
relations"" Indeed, he perceived his task as one of founding means of pro-
tectmg British interests in China, and defending Bntam’s dignity and 
prestige agamst the assaults of血eJapan田emilitary without recourse to 
"' a口ns.
On arival in Japan in September 1937, he was hopeful that he would 
accomplish his task His opllrmsm r田tedon his belief血atmoderate 
leaders in Japan were“willing to collaborate in circumscribmg the il-
effects on Anglo-Japanese relations of the conflict in China ”“百1田e
moderates，”he町gued，“werefor the most p町t回spiciousof N但 iaims, 
antagonistic to the Germ阻sas a race, convinced血atJapan’s ultimate 
aims would be achieved by reaching some friendly understanding with 
Great Britain and the United States.’， In short, Craigie divided the 
Japanese society加totwo: the mihtansts and世田moderatesEven when 
he was charitable enough to admit出atthe ultimate objective of由e
militarists and the moderates were the s出neー thatis, the establishment 
of a Japanese pohtical and economic hegemony m Eastern Asia and 
southwestern Pacific he believed that there was a difference in也e
methods by which the objective could be achieved. According to him, 
“the more moderate elements be!Jeved that a m吋orwar with another 
great Power should be avoided and the objective secured through the 
exercise of polillcal pressure combmed with the prosecution of a vigor-
ous policy of commercial and mdustrial expansion; the extremists, on出e
other hand, held this method to be too slow and too uncertam and be-
lieved that war with Great Britain and possibly the United States must be 
faced at no distant date”1> 
On the other hand, the Foreign Office officials由oughtthe distinction 
Craigie made between the moderates and the mihtarists was more ap-
parent than real. They drd not even see出eso-called moderates m Japan 
as the spiritual heirs to that earlier hberal tradition in the country which 
was genuinely opposed to the whole conception of national aggrand包e-
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ment at the expense of血eirweaker neighbours'." In short, the Far East-
em Department of the Foreign Office denied吐ieexistence of moderates 
in Japan, and even if they existed, officials in the Foreign Office did not 
think that they counted much加血eformulation of Japan’s foreign 
policy between 1937 and 1941, a view that has now been validated by 
recent researches'." 
The fundamental difference between Craigie and the Foreign Office 
about their conception of Japanese society h血e1930’s was to pro” 
foundly affect their policy orientation. Whlle Craigie held that British 
diplomacy towards Japan during the critical years of 1937-41 sho叫d
have been one of “extreme flexibility designed to play opposing forces 
against each other" smce, according to him，“the militarists were con-
stantly facmg a solid ma田 ofconservative opimon, representmg the 
Court, Finance, Industry, the m句orityof the politicians and most of the 
intelligentsia，” the Foreign Office wanted the British Government to 
adopt a firm attitude.“The only sure foundation for a policy towards 
Japan was a prudent and dispassionate appr剖阻Iof the general direction 
of Japanese pohcy，” the Foreign Of:白ceconcluded in 1943. In essence, 
officials of the Far Eastern Department of the Foreign Office were con-
vinced that the Japanese were set on a course of exp叩 sionand it was 
necessary for B口tainto stand forth with determination against them. 
Thus，担 the1rinterpretat10n of Japanese attltudes as well as the tactics 
and strategy to adopt, Sir Robert Craigie and the Foreign Of自ceofficials 
had senous disagreements The Far Eastern Department.seems to have 
accepted Japanese mtlitansm as the all-sufficient cause of trouble in the 
Far East in the 1930’s, and to have been litle impressed by the existence 
of moderate opinion m Japan. 
The first m句ordisagreement on policy between Sir Robert Craigie 
and世ieForeign Office was on how to resolve the undeclared war be-
tween Chma and Japan which occurred on 7 July 1937.開ien血eSino-
Japanese war broke out on the day, the Foreign Office officials were 
quick to hold Japan responsible for the war. It is now easy to assume, 
reading血roughthe註minuteson由eChlna Incident, that the Foreign 
Office officials were decidedly biased against the Japanese. But the fresh-
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ne田 of血eManchunan Incident m their memones underlined their 
reaction to the Smo-Japanese conflict. The head of the Far Eastern 
Department, Charles Orde, who had then served in也atdepartment 
for seven years, wrote a perceptive mmute to show that Jap阻 seized
on the Lukuochiao Incident to advance血eobjectives of its policy. 
“Qmte probably，” he wrote，“血eLukuochiao Incident was not 
deliberately engmeered it was seized upon叩 dexploited for the 
furtherance of a policy of blatant aggr田sionwhich the Japanese have 
not the good manners to attempt to conceal.，“What cannot be contested 
for two minutes，＇’ he asserted，“IS that it was provocative and unneces-
坦ryto hold mght manoeuvres in that area, and what is common know-
ledge to anyone who has resided in North China is that the employment 
and demeanor of Japanese military 1s always marked by the ma担皿um
po路ibleprovocative offensiveness.”Nigel Ronald agreed and further 
contended that the occurrence of the incident did afford the Army the 
excuse“to let in motion a plan long and care白lyprepared m advance 
and of very considerable scope, the exact object of which ortly the pre-
sent accomplishment can show.”Alex Cadogan, the Permanent Under-
secretary and former Minister in China whose expenences in the Far 
East had left him no JapanophiJ, minuted：“In spite of reassuring mes-
sages from Tokyo, I C四 not田yI like the look of things. The Japanese 
assurances that出eywant a local settlement remind me forcefully of 
six years ago and I couldn’t put much faith in them yet ... I hope my 
pessimism w出 proveunfounded.” 11• Eden, thus, decided to take a de-
finite lead as regards the Far Eastern crisis. But Eden was awa田 thata 
recent assessment of the strategic situation in the Far East had revealed 
出eweakness of Bntam in the region'" The need to approach the Uruted 
States became evident. If it was the unspoken assumption of the British 
Cabinet as well as the Foreign Office oficials血ata united front of both 
the Uruted States and Britain would help to reduce militarism in Jap阻，
the Umted States did not allow such an a田umptionto be tested. Startley 
Hornbeck, the head of the Far Eastern division in the State Department, 
told Ronald Lindsay, the British Ambassador to the United States, that 
the American Administration saw the町1portanceof Anglo-American 
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cooperation m exchanging mformat10n about the dispute and・ of acting 
on parallel lines m relat10n to it But Hornbeck stressed that with the 
existmg temper of the Japanese Government, it' was to be feared that 
“any concerted action might defeat its own obiect.叩 Thisview was 
consistently held by American spokesmen throughout July. 
The collapse of Eden’s quest for叩 Anglo-Americanjoint action 
might have been followed by a period of disillusioned, and preferably, ，． 
ominous silence on Britain’s part, especially since she did not possess the 
force to back up a vigorous interventiomst policy in the Far East. But 
Eden took the view that an effort must be made to secure a settlement of 
the Far Eastern cnsis He laboured hard to achieve a standstill泊 troop
movements, which he perceived as a threat to peace in the region. The 
Japanese turned deaf ear$ to Eden’s plea, saymg that they would pr泡fera 
local settlement of the dispute.間 Asit turned out, al efforts to arrive at 
a local settlement of the・ dispute in July proved白tile.
By August, the war had spread to Shangh田， thecitadel of Western 
influence in China. But the consensus of opinion in the Foreign Office 
was that Britain should follow a policy calculated to avert embroilment 
with, but not appeasement of, Japan 
Though the British did not like the Chinese appeal to the League of 
Nallons，出eycooperated with the League m condemning Japan’s agres・ 
sion m China. 
Meanwhile, the role which the British had played in the Sino-Japanese 
conflict between July and September 1937 did not please Sir Robert 
Craigie, who succeeded Sir Robert Clive as British Ambassador to Japan 
in September 1937. Craigie would have preferred British mediation in 
the crisis to any possible reference of it to the Nine-Power conference, 
for he feared that the discussion of the crisis at a Nme-Power conference 
would only strengthen the posit10n of the military extremists in Japan, 
and even push that country mto the arms of Germany Smce he beheved 
血ata large group of civihan moderates in Japan wished to end the fight・ 
mg by agreement, he advised his government to pursue mediation~＇ 
Craigie did not proVIde any concrete evidence to support his clarm 
that a large group of civilian moderates wanted to end the crisis by agre・ 
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ment, nor did he identify thls group and its influence in Japan. What 
actually happened in September was that the Japanese General Staff 
expressed its eagerness for a prompt settlement of the China Incident~＂ 
but it consistently maintained its preference for German mediation. 
Perhaps Craigie got wind of出s,and wanted to preempt German media-
hon, hence hls appeals to hls government to mediate m the crisis. 
Such mediation, according to Craigie, must be based on list of peace 
proposals whlch he olitamed from “an absolutely reliable”Japanese 
source. These proposals include the establishment of a neutral zone in 
North China, the recognition of Manchukuo, the retention of Japanese 
自orcesm North China and the independence of Inner Mongolia，町nong
others?' 
The British Foreign Office received the peace proposals with a hlgh 
degree of skepllcism, and would have liked to leave them m abeyance 
since they did not世由lkthat China would be prepared to bow to Japan’s 
wil It was also feared that If the Japan回eterms were transmitted to 
Nank泊ι“Bntammight become inconveniently凪volved.＇’四
Craigie refused to be persuaded by such an argument. The urgency of 
the case for negotiations was expounded by hlm on 29 September 1937, 
m a remarkable telegram to London He r句ectedthe policies of inaction 
or sitting on the fence. For he argued that，“if negotiations were started 
at once, Japan would agree to leave Nanking with an authority泊 the
northern provmces not les and possibly even greater than that exercised 
befo自由epresent incident occurred担 returnfor econonuc concesSJons 
by Chlna. Tokyo would also want the Chinese to resist the spread of 
communism, to grant de facto日cogrutionto Manchukuo and allow 
Japan to a田istInner Mongolia in blocking Soviet penetrat10n”The 
British Government must not dillydally.“If London and Nanking 
delayed at al, the Japanese terms would harden . Japan nught soon 
crush Chlang Kai-Shek. . . Itwas futile to hope that the Japanese 
armies would be defeated either by China or by fmancial difficulties at 
home . . . Thus, Britain should make the Chine団 facefacts and help 
them recover by diplomacy what they were never likely to rega加 by
force of arms”四
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This was a bold, if somewhat equivocal proposal, which engendered 
much uneasy debate, not al of it unfavourable, among the cabinet. 
Anthony Eden and some cabinet members were extremely四spiciousof 
Japanese peace terms. Many cabmet members did not want Britain to 
act as an mtermediary between Japan and China, as such ac世onwould 
breach Bntam's neutrality m the war.四
However, Neville Chamberlain, who thought hi民lyof Craigie, wanted 
to give his ideas and proposal a trial. He believed that it was impor担nt
也atBritain should not miss叩yopportunity to brmg about a cessation 
of the present horrors正itcould be done without undue risks to B口tish 
interests. 
Ch田nberlain’svrnws carried the day; the Japanese terms were trans-
mitted to Nanking. But Eden’s doubts soon materialized. There was 
httle or nothing血 thepeace propo回lsto attract Chiang Kai・Shek, who 
would setle for nothing les th阻 completesovereignty of North China~＇ 
Craigie was predictably disappointed by the failure of his initiative. 
He was, no doubt, a man of resource, courage and ideas; he was smgle-
minded in the pursuit of his goals. But on血1soccasion, he allowed 
himself to be carned away by his admirat10n for the Japanese, his per-
ceived weakness of China and his abhorrence of Bolshevism. He genuine・ 
ly believed that Japan was the only bulwark against Bolshevism m也e
Far East, and as such, must be conciliated. But Craigie did not allow 
such a disappointment to dampen his enthusiasm. 
On 4 November 1937, Craig1e sent an important telegram to London 
which clearly revealed his mind It was an invaluable telegram as it 
judged the rights and wrongs of the British role at也eLeague of Nations, 
and revealed his conception of也eFar Eastern s1tual!on. He was of the 
opinion that Japan was hostile to Britain because of the lead the latter 
took in proposmg廿国 Leagueresolution which condemned Japan as an 
aggressor. He recounted some other mea四回swluchBnta担hadtaken to 
excite Japan’s host血ty，副nongwhich were the calling of the Brussels 
conference and the economic measures which Britain had taken since 
1932 to mitigate白eeffect of Japanese economic competition担世田
British Empire. 
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Craigie’s categorical disapproval of the United States’role and his 
awareness of the lack of BritISh defence in the Far East in other parts of 
his despatch sincerely exp同時edhis intentions. He believed that since 
Bntain's lack of military power, her preoccupation with the European 
situation, and her泊abilityto secure Washington’s cooperation made it 
imperative for her to av01d trouble m East ASia, the wisest pohcy would 
have been to seek cooperation with Japan in the hope of exercising a 
restraining influence on her. He thought that the Japanese would “listen 
to us as they would listen to no one else ”Thus, he urged吐iatBritain 
must sufficiently demonstrate that she was not irretrievably opposed to 
every Japanese ambition, and did not view in the worst pos出bleH出t
every Japanese activity. He concluded with an advice to出eBrill血
Government that it must have the courage of its conviction to advise 
China to make reasonable terms whlie“reasonable terms are stil to be 
had.”刷
Craigie’s telegram plunged the Foreign Office officials into an agitated 
discussion of the propriety of appeasing Jap叩.Henderson feared that 
fnendship with Japan would involve an economic mflitration which 
“our economic organi田tionm the outlying parts of the Empire is too 
weak to withstand ... Cool relations with Japan are desirable untli our 
rmpenal economic structure is adequate to withstand the shocks of the 
energetic and efficient Japanese attack to which it will be subjected if 
opportunity offers ．” 
Also H. H. Thomas disagreed with Craigie’s view that Japan would 
listen to Britain. What Craigie overlooked, as田ggestedby Thomas, was 
that，“the Japanese are in an expansionist mood, and the exponents of 
expanSion know that inevitably they must sooner or later come mto 
collision either with Russia or with British Empire . They seem to 
廿由1kthat no time will be more favourable for a clash with us than now 
when we have so many other preoccupatrnns Whilst they are in this 
expansionist and aggressive mood, it will be quite impossible for us to be 
on terms of friendship with them ... I do not think these people would 
listen to us as they would not to any one else.”四
The Foreign Office’s apt assessment of Japan’s militarism did not 
The Pac.fie War Debate加Bnta踊 47
con由 ceRobert Cr梅田.He believed that expediency called for an 
Anglo-Japanese rapprochement. When the broadening of Japan’s actiVI-
ties泊 Chma血 1938was severely underminmg Western interests in 
Sh四 ghai,Tien臼in,Amoy, and threatened the British stake in the Mari-
t泊四 Customs,Crargie was aruaous to arnve at a mαius vcvendi with 
the 抑制seGovernment. The吋ewthat Craigie put strongly to the 
Foreign Office in July 1938 was that a satisfactory agreement with世田
Japanese was po田rbleif direct negotiations with them started immediate-
ly. Craigie warmly supported direct negotiatrons especially because 
General Ugaki Kazushige, a liberai by the standards of the Japanese 
Army and a moderate, had been appointed Foreign Secretary smce May. 
With the appointment of General Ugaki by Premier Kanae, Craigie 
thought that political condit旧郎副 Japanwere ripe enough to reach a 
working ar加 gementwith her, which would safeguard British interests in 
China and perhaps pave the way for an Anglo-Japanese rapprochement.四
Though the Foreign Office doubted Craigie’s opt加ism,he was allowed 
to enter加tonegotiations with Generai Ugaki.0” 
It soon became cle町 thatCraigie’s optimism was unfounded. Though 
Ug依iwas a moderate, he shared the politrcal vision of the Japanese 
military. He could not, on his own, arrive at any agreement with Craigie, 
without the consent of the military. That consent was not forthcoming, 
mdeed the military regarded the diplomatic exchanges as a sign of 
Japan’s weakness. The hostile attitude of the military to the Craigie-
Ugaki talks confirmed the view consistently held by the Foreign Office 
也atmoderates and militarists sh町edsimilar foreign policy object四国，
and where the moderates' objectives differed from the military’s, the 
latter’s view would be predommant. Thus, rt did not come as a surp口se
to白eForeign Office officials血atnegotiations between Craigie and 
Ugaki foundered on the irreconcilable mterests between the two co国ト
tries.刷
Craigre contmued, however, to show interest in negotiations with 
Japan. Thus, we were to witness another instance of serious disagree-
ment on policy between Cr瓜副eand the Foreign Office soon after the 
Japanese had proclaimed the “New Order" in East Asia in November 
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1938. c悶igiewas perturbed by the new developments in East Asia, 
and feared that Japan might move clo田rto Germany and Italy. He 
阻isedthis specter in his telegram to the Foreign 0節目 on2 De回 mber
1938. 
Then, he had written to Hahfax, expressmg his conviction of吐te
absolute necessity for good Anglo-Japanese relations in由einterest of 
peace in East Asia; he thus stressed from the start the need to wean 
Japan away from the totalitanan states. For he thought that the strength-
ening of the Anti-Comintern Pact would be a turning pomt in Japan’s 
history. Besides encouragmg Jap阻“toprosecute conflict a outrance，” 
he asserted that，“百 Japanwere allowed to enter into a hard and fast 
alliance with the totalitarian Powers, the process of ultimate reconcilia-
tion with Great Britain would obv10usly be retarded, if not completely 
arrested.”His anxiety arose from his own understanding of the German 
character, and the pressure he血oughtthe Germans would exert on the 
Japanese. For Craigie told Halifax that Germany was always fond of 
demandmg from her alies “their pound of flesh ”If也1shappened, 
there would be no alternative for Japan th叩 tofal more and more 
under the German influence “Moreover, in Germany itself，＇’ Craigie 
reasoned，“the advocates of a rapprochement with Great Brit副nmust 
surely lose ground if their country were to enter so powerful a m出tary
combmat10n directed pnmanly against ourselves.” 
It was, therefore，出sentialto Bntish policy to deter Japan from 
strengthening the Anti-Comintern Pact. This depended, Craigie thought, 
upon the maintenance of close Anglo-Japanese relations, which could 
only be achieved 1f Britain was prepared to cooperate with Japan He 
now explained what he meant by cooperation：“It need not necessarily 
involve a complete surrender to the wishes of the Japanese extremists or 
the abandonment of the cause of China: However, it would defm1tely 
mean the abandonment of any further scheme to support or give material 
assistance to由e四回meof Chiang Kai-Shek.”“It would mean，＇’ he 
clauned，“recog凶tionof the actual fact of Japan’s military and economic 
predommance担 Chinatoday and an effort to wm back ultimate Chinese 
independence through cooperation with Japan and China, in estabhshing 
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that assured market and that source of raw mater凶swhich represent 
Japan’s primary needs in the economic field” 
Craigie, nonetheless, recognized th叫 hissuggested line of policy 
would not be attractive to世田 ForeignOffice because of what he per-
ceived to be their permanent antr-Japanese bias of世間 oficials,but he 
caut10ned that it should not be rejected out of hand if the need to 
separate Japan from the totalitarian countnes was considered real and 
urgent. For he warned that if the Anti-Comintern Pact turned into a 
defensive alliance, the tensions and rivalries that had bedevilled Anglo-
Japanese relations since the Smo-Japanese conflict broke out would only 
mcrease in intensity. In fact, he favoured British cooperation with the 
Japanese on another important count. He perceived China as a weak 
country, whose resistance to Japan would soon collapse. And he自eared
that under Japan’s political domination, China might become the in-
strument of her imperialist designs m Asia. As he put it，“with China 
dommated, eqmpped, organized, trarned and directed by Japan, the 
Yellow Peril would become not a mere abstract conception but a harsh 
and pressing reality. Its first manifestation would doubtlessly take the 
form of the swamping of foreign markets by goods produced by Chinese 
labour under Japanese supervis10n, but its ultimate aim would be politi-
cal ”Strategic considerations seemed to govern Craigie’s attitude at this 
time. He was keenly aware of the power structure m which he was 
operatmg m吐ieFar East, and回whimself as a guardian of由eBritish 
imperial interests in the region within it. Thus, he advised Halifax that 
it was only through cooperat10n with Japan that Bntain could safeguard 
her imperial interests m the Far East. This was the more so when he 
knew that the United States Administrat10n“would not proceed beyond 
protests and remonstrances and would even prefer, to the risk of war, 
a progressive withdrawal of their interests m China and the Far East.” 
And from his experience, protests and remonstrance温hadnot succeeded 
m enliancmg “our prestige in the Far East or securing proper respect for 
our mterests in China.＇’田
This su錦町lionwas not attractive to the Foreign Office After al, the 
post Munich and the post Anglo-Italian agreements did not lead to better 
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relations between Britain and these Powers. For instance, on 2 Novem-
ber 1938, Ribbentrop, the German Foreign Secretary, and Ci叩 o,his 
Italian opposite, had met at the Belvedere Palace m Vienna to carve out 
of the southern boundary of Czechoslovakia an ar国 tosatisfy the 
Hungarian claims without referring either to Chamberlam or Daladier.帥
This was no doubt a breach of the Munich spirit, and there is no evidence 
to suggest that the appeasement of Japan would have been wise if 1t had 
not paid off elsewhere. 
Thus, the Foreign Office officials were right in rejecting Craigie’s 
suggestion But more importantly, their strategy differed from his. 
To Sir John Brenan，“the goal to be aimed at is nothing les th組曲e
weakening of the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo tnangle by a sluewd blow at its 
weakest member. If there is any pos剖bilityof achieving this in coopera-
tion with the U.S., the problem is at least worth considering担出at
light.”This view was supported by William Strang, an Assistant Secre-
tary of State and formerly head of the Central Department of the For-
e1伊 Office. This position seemed to be rationalized thus: There was no 
general disposition in the United States to sympathize with Japanese 
amb1t10ns泊EastAsia; m fact, Japan was in no mood to compromise. As 
he summed it up・ 
I do not myself believe that the Japanese could be bought off by 
any compromise or concess10n that we could safely offer them・ 
nor does their present military and economic posilion seem to be 
so strong as to warrant our choosing this moment to abandon 
Chiang Kai-Shek and by so domg nip in the bud a useful form of 
collaboration with like-minded governments in Europe which has 
already gone far beyond what we co凶dhave dared to hope for a 
few months ago. 
This sentlment was echoed by the Southern Department：“to make use 
of the sympa血yand support of出eU S.A. must surely remam the 
cardinal principle m the conduct of our foreign policy.” 
Strang opposed Craigie’s SU邸est10non a more senous note. To him, 
由edistinction which Craigie drew between “Japan’s undesirable liaison” 
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and her “mesal/iance”with her fellow a田ociatesof the Anti Commtern 
Pact was u町ea!.Strang echoed a general feeling in the Foreign Office 
when he asserted 
The Anti-Commtern Pact in its present form is a powerful diplo 
matic instrument and has had a potent effect upon the interna-
tional situation to our disadvantages. The Anti-Comintern Powers 
do not need to be m alliance in order to help each other to secure 
advantages and there are s培nsthat they are likely m the coming 
year to push what they conceive to be their advantage for the 
achievement of new objectives of wide scope ... The Pact is of the 
greatest danger to us even m its present form, and we have some 
reason to think that Herr Hitler, with his weH-known contempt for 
paper obligations, is not in favour of establishing precise contract-
ual obligations between the parties smce he holds that m case of a 
general conflict, the three parhes concerned wtll act in the manner 
best designed to serve their own interests whatever their obligations 
might be ．．刷
It was against this background that Halifax r句ec臼dcooperation with 
Japan. The discontent and dension Halifax and his advisers shared on 
Craigie’s SU銘estionalso greeted, not surprisingly, Shigemitsu's plan for 
an Anglo-Japanese ・cooperation in the Far East. Shigemitsu, who had 
assumed office as Japan’s ambassador to Britain m 1938, had proposed 
that Britain should recognize Japan’s special position in China while a 
Comrmttee would be appointed at Shanghai to discuss outstanding 
Anglo-Japanese problems'. Sir George Mounsey, an Assistant Secretary 
m the Far Eastern Department, summed up the strength of opposition in 
血eForeign Office when he said that the scheme was“preposterous -we 
are to concede precisely what Japan wants in exchange for mere consul-
tation in regard to al our legit加ategnev岨 C白川目
In sum, Britam was not p問paredto cooperate with Japan, as Cadogan 
po凪tedout，“for fear of alienating the United States opinion ”Not only 
that, there was the all-pervading reason that Japan could not dominate 
China目 Inother words, British leaders did not share C団 gie’sanxiety 
about the collapse of China. On I November 1938, Neville Chamberlain 
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had exp凶nedto the House of Conunons也at,con仕aryto Clement 
Attlee’S view that Japan was closrng one of the largest potential markets 
rn the world, there would be great opportu凶tiesfor British capital rn 
China at the end of the Smo-Japanese conflict This, explained Butler, 
meant that British capital would be able to help China in the work of 
reconstruction, and did not an!Jc1pate a Japanese dommated China曲
There, the matter of conciliatmg Japan rested. It would appear that 
the Foreign Office had complete control over the conduct of Britain’S 
Far Eastern policy. This was necessarily吐iecase because of the Cabinet’s 
preoccupation with the European Situation. 
When in June 1939, the Foreign Office, as a result of poor mforma-
!Jon, was mishandlrng the Tientsin crisis a crisis which could have led 
to a war between Britain and Japan the Cabinet asserted its authonty 
over the formulation of Britain’S Far Eastern policy. The strongest man 
m the Cabinet w回世間PrimeMlillster, Neville Chamberlam, who ensured 
that his diplomacy did not outrun his resources.出sactive role in the 
Cabinet during the Tientsin crisis reveals that he shared Craigie’s view 
that the maintenance of British prestige in the Far East would depend on 
not antagomzing Japan. 
Thus the British Cabinet moved quickly to recognize the actual situa-
tion in白eFar East. This was no doubt a victory for Sir Robert Craigie, 
but it was s叫Ifar short of his conception of Anglo-Japanese cooperat10n. 
Indeed the Tientsin Agreement which was eventually signed in June 1940 
reveals that Craigre was not allowed by the Foreign Office to sign away 
British interests in the Far East. The Foreign Office insisted and er即日d
出atthe Fapi (Chinese currency) was not prohibited m血eTientsin con-
cess10n; the silver was sealed in the Ba叫《ofCommunications rather than 
in the Yokohama Specie Bank as the Japanese had demanded. And the 
compronuse decision contamed m 由etext such as using part of the 
silver for relief purposes limited, rather白叩extended,Japan’s control 
over Chinese silver, for it was to be supervised by jo担tAnglo-Japanese 
staf.聞 Thus,the Foreign Office’s position seemed to reveal that they 
would never condone Japanese ambitions in China. 
The agreement of June 1940 left the Japanese with a keen sense of 
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outrage. The pressure they soon mounted on Bntain to close the Burma 
Road was partly an expression of也eirfrustration and partly due to吐国
fortunes of the European war. The German triumphs of May and June 
1940，回pecially吐iefal of France, added impetus to the Japanese desire 
to strangulate the Chinese economy and weaken their resistance. This led 
the Japanese to put pressure on Fr叩 ceto stop由epa田ageof munitions 
to China也roughIndo China, which吐ieFrench accepted. With血e
closure of the Indochina-China route, the Burma Road, apart from the 
Sinkiang Road from Russia, became valuable as China’s ma血 meansof 
commumcat10ns w1血 theoutside world Not surprisingly, the Japanese 
saw the route as a symbol of oppo剖t10nto出eirwar in China since muni-
tions由atgot through it to China propped up the Chinese resistance. 
Sir Robert Craigie血ought也atJapan’s demand for the closure of the 
Burma Road, and the European si印ation,especially世田 falof Fr叩 ce,
were enough reasons for the Foreign Office to make a fundamental 
readjustment of Bntish Far Eastern policy. He would like the Foreign 
Office to re-exaniine, and forget about the reliance Britain had hitherto 
placed on the United States As he summarized his feehngs, he noted: 
In the wide' context of policy, we have been content to rely on世ie
Uruted States which has favoured a purely negative policy designed 
to wear down Japanese resistance由atthe army泊 Japanwould be 
deposed from its paramount position. Whatever merit there may 
have been in this policy before the French collapse, it is now cer-
tainly ineffective Long before 1t co叫dproduce results, the whole 
face of things m the Far East may be changed by that very army at 
winch the United States seeks to strike with such puny weapons." 
In other words, Craig1e was censuring the policy of世田 UnitedStates, 
阻 dat血e田me世me,warning the British leaders血at也eaロnyin Japan 
was gradually occupying a predominant position m decision-making. 
Thus, he favoured a negotiated compromise m也 Japan.Lord Lothian 
advised Halifax to make a settlement with Japan “based on血epresent 
day realities阻 dwhich it might be wtlhng to accept.”醐
These ambassadors' urgings on Halifax to forget about the Umted 
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States in the calculations of Briti血泊teresth血eFar East were not 
shared by the Chiefs of Staf. The strategic appreciation conducted in 
June 1940 concluded也atthe British Government could not send rein-
forcements to the Far East even if Japan sought to alter the status伊0血
血atregion and出at“weshould therefore have to rely on the U.S.A. to 
safeguard our interests也ere.’川 With世tisstrategic appreciation, a 
fundamental readjustment of Britam's Far Eastern policy as suggested by 
Craigie and Lothian was impossible. This seemed to be the verdict of the 
Foreign Office oficials and Lord Halifax, for rather than embarking on 
a曲目叩ghreappraisal of Britain’S Far Eastern policy, Halifax sought血e
opinion of Cordell Hull, who advised that it was preferable to submit 
to force majeure th叩 ma!世間agreementof appeasing character"" 
Indeed, Churchill has at血esame time come to the conclusion that 
smce the Japanese military possessed mercurial temperament, it would be 
suicidal folly to incur their hostilities for reasons mainly of prestige. One 
significant point worth noting in this Burma Road episode was that 
Churchill's perception of Japanese society was confused and blurred 
In acceptmg to close the road, he revealed his distrust in the Japanese 
military, whose control over policy he did not doubt. But deep down 
in Churchill’s mmd was the feelmg that the closure of the road would 
have a sobering effect in Tokyo. Churcltill seemed to share the hope of 
Sir Robert Craigie in Tokyo that the period of three months for which 
the road would be temporarily closed would be used to search for an 
understanding with Japan. 
There was really very litle in al this to attract the Foreign Office. 
Nevertheless, the Foreign Office produced a comprehensive peace pro-
posal, without enthusiasm, for other government departments to con, 
sider."' As 1t turned out, these government departments, including the 
Ministry of Economic Warfare, Colonial, Dominion, India and Burma 
Offices, and the Petroleum Department, were unenthuStastic about a 
general settlement with Japan. 
The objection to a general settlement with Japan gathered cogency 
dunng August and September when Konoe’S government put pressure on 
the Vichy Administration in lildo China to grant Japan bases in the 
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northern half of the country, and then aligned Japan overtly with Ger-
many and Italy in出etripartite pact. In essence, the Jap皿eserefused to 
be appeased by the closure of the Burma Road, and with the warding off 
of German threat to Britam, Churchill felt free to reopen the road to 
traffic in October 1940. 
The opening of the road took place at a time the Japanese were mov-
ing mto Southeast Asia to gain access to raw materials, especially the oil 
resources of the Netherlands East Indie喝. For Britain, as well as the 
United States, Japan’s move into Southeast Asia brought into sharp focus 
the defence of East Asian balance of power. Bnt副n’Spolicy began to 
harden as it searched around for a deterrent. British leaders made at-
temp臼toconcert defence efforts with the hope of improving the加age
of the Bntish Government m Japan It soon became clear, however, 
that Britain’s defence calculations in the Far East were not shared by世田
United States：，血deedthe United States refused to accept responsibility 
for the defence of the Singapore naval base, the m副npivot of British 
defence in the Far East~＇ Lack of cooperation between Britain and the 
United States on defence matters relating to the Far East seemed to con-
vince the Japanese that the two Democracies were not yet ready for war 
in the region This would perhaps explain世田 intransigenceof the 
Japanese m their irrevocable commitment to move southwards. Yet, 
Japan’s southward expansion seemed to have overshadowed, in Western 
eyes, the Sino-Japanese conflict, for it appeared that the Japanese were 
prepared to launch an assault on British and American interests in South-
east Asia. Indeed, the intention of the Japanese, as perceived by Sir 
Robert Craigie at the time, was to secure bases in Indo-China, Siam, from 
where to launch an ulUmate attack on Singapore刷
The British suspicion of the trend of Japanese policy gathered 
strength as from February 1941町凶dstrumours of an imminent Japan-
ese attack Churchill, in particular, was becoming apprehensive of the 
Japanese posture m Southeast Asia As he told Roosevelt on 15 Feb-
四町y1941, Japanese intentions were by no means clear, but an attack 
on British po田e田ionswas defmitely possible. Thus, he appealed pas-
s10nately to Roosevelt to do al he could “to mspire the Japanese with 
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世田 fearof a double war ..，” for he warned Roosevelt that ‘＇if they 
come加 ag副nstus and we are alone, the grave character of the conse-
quences cannot eastly be overstated ”岨Howeverslow the Uruted States 
responded to Churchill’s appeal, it soon became clear that Roosevelt 
was willing to check Japan’s exp叩 s10nmto Southeast Asia. He imposed 
economic sanctions against Japan in July 1941. 
The leadership of the Urtlted States was viewed from different per-
spectives by Sir Robert Craigie and the Foreign Office. In the main, 
Craigie thought that the conduct of diplomacy in the United States had 
always erred on the side of rigidity and formality, whereas the Far 
Eastern situation called for a reasonable elas!Icity in d1ploma!Ic techrtl-
que. He did not share the opinion current in the United States that 
economic sanctions could put Japan “on the spot，＇’ or make her yield 
to a general settlement involvmg peace with China, or that Jap阻， in-
volved m a four-year war with China, was not in a pos1!Jon to risk war 
with the Urtlted States Rather, he believed that the Japanese economic 
structure was resilient, that the Japanese Government was progressively 
concentrating al available economic resources upon the building up of 
their war potential, and finally, that the China war was no耐1pediment
to Japanese ability to prosecute war elsewhere. Thus, he warned the 
Foreign Office not to delude themselves担tobelleving that the Japanese 
could not attack the British and the United States posse田ionin the Far 
East anytime." Craigie’s views were greatly mfluenced by what he 
perceived as the ominous inten!Jons of the military担 Tokyoand the 
temper of the Japanese Cabinet, especially after the fal of Konoe Cabi-
net m October 1941. C阻igie’sperception of a direct, not-too-distant 
Japanese threat to the Urtlted States and her po田e田ionsinfluenced his 
ardent deme to see the British Government show keen interest in the 
Japanese-U.S. talks which had been proceed加gm Washington since May 
1941. Craigie would have liked Britam to exercise a moder~ting in-
fluence on both Japan and the United States In essence, he wanted 
Bntain to par!Icipate actuaily in the conversat10n. But there are reasons 
to belleve that Bntain was not interested m the conversation. When Eden 
heard about the pl叩 ofthe United States to engage m conversa!Jon w1出
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Japan in mid-May 1941, he left no doubts in the minds of Cordell Hull 
about his object10ns. Eden made the percepl!ve observat10n that Japan’s 
alliance with Germany and Italy severely limited its ab出tyto resolve 
the Far Eastern crisis by diplomacy Moreover, he regarded Japan’s 
diplomatic moves in Wa由担gtonas a calculated ploy to drive a wedge 
between the United States and Britain. What further strengthened 
Eden’s m1sg1vings about the talks was Japan’s recent Neut四lityPact 
with世間 SovietUnion. Eden reasoned that the Pact would facilitate 
Japan’s“peaceful penetration into Southeast Asia, where she would 
build up her defences in order to attack Malaya and the Netherlands East 
Indies.”It was reasonable, m these crc山nstances,for the United States 
to adopt a firm policy towards Japan, for as Eden concluded, the talks 
would be inadequate to solve the Far Eastern crisis. 
In Washington, Cordell Hull was mfunated by Eden’s reaction When 
Halifax saw him on 25 May, he was加“astate of pained and reproachful 
indignat10n ... to have received a‘lecture’from H.M.G.”Nevertheless, 
he explained that he was trying to postpone Japanese action in view of 
the British posit10n m世田Atlanticand the Mediterranean, and could not 
understand why Eden should be disturbed except he doubted the United 
States intelligence and good faith;" The Foreign Office has since used 
Hull’s explanat10n to explain the B口tishGovernment’s decis10n to leave 
the conduct of the conversation entirely m the hands of血eUnited 
States.叫 Butthis was not the whole story. The ob1ecl!ve of Brit!Sh Far 
Eastern policy which Churchill vigorously pur四edwas to secure血e
active intervention of the United States m the Far Eastern situation -an 
o句ect1vewhich seemed to have been realized with the inception of 
Japan-U S. conversation. It thus seems unlikely也atChurchill，担parti-
cular, would accept Craigie’s advice to intervene dec1S1vely in吐国 talks
Meanwhile, the negotiations泊 Washingtonproceeded without the 
United States giving adequate mformation to the Bnt!Sh Government. 
The discuss10n of the conversation need not detam us here; by mid-
November, the talks had reached a critical stage Deadlock seemed 
釦lmmentas Cordell Hull and Kurusu failed to see each other’s point of 
view. At由jsstage, Sir Robert Craigie and the Foreign Office held di-
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vergent views about Kurusu's mission to Wa也ington.C四igiebelieved 
that Kurusu, though acceptable to the Japanese army, was a leader of the 
pro-American party担 Japan,who did not want war with the Western 
Democracies. And if he discovered a real basis for a compromise with世田
Umted States, he would use his decisive influence in the army to get出e
agreement accepted As Craigie wrote in 1943，“I regarded -and stil 
regardー thisstep as having been a genuine effort on出epart of the 
Japanese Govermnent to prevent a rupture with the Umted States川島
On the other hand, the Foreign 0節目believedthat there was nothing 
moderate in Kurusu's demeanour when he arnved in Washington. Rely-
ing on a Dutch source担 theFar East, the Foreign Office held that 
Kurusu had nothing new to offer, and moreover, that he merely went to 
Washington to discover whether the United States Administration was 
bluffing In short, Kurusu could never have been阻 agentof peace m 
the United States~＇ This was an accurate assessment of Japan’s position, 
自orthere is yet no evidence to suggest也atJapan wanted to abandon 
her dreams of Asian domination in 1941. 
However, the divergent attitude of Craigie and the Foreign Office 
affected their policy positions concerning the Japanese compromise 
propo田lof 20 November 1941. On that day, the Japanese represen祖・
!Ives in Was!由1gtonput forward a proposal for a partial or interrm setle-
ment based on a virtual re加mto世田statusquo ante at the t加eof也e
Japanese entry回tosouthern Indo China. In e田ence,Japan would be 
prepared to move her troops m southern Indo China to northern Indo-
China, and on conclusion of peace with China, the Umted States would 
lift the economic embargo on Japan, especially也esupply of oil. The 
rest of the proposal was that neither govermnent was to send any armed 
forces into southwest Pacific areas except Indo-Chma and they were to 
cooperate in securmg commod1!Jes from the Netherlands East Indies. 
It was at this point that Cordell Hull thought it fit to consult由e
Bri!Jsh Govermnent on the conversat10n. Craigie held也ata nwdus 
vivendi on Indo-China alone could be arrived at, for that would remove 
the threat of a Japanese offensive against Yunnan from northern Indo-
China. Apart from this strategic advantage, Craigie seemed to believe 
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that a compromise could be reached on the basis that the Uruted States 
and Bntain would supply to Japan only such raw materials as could be 
spared, having regard to the importance of their own war requirements 
He was convmced that this could be worked out in such a way to pre-
vent any actual mcrease in Japan’s war stocks.副
But events moved so rapidly that吐tistelegram did not reach London 
before the Foreign Office replied to Hull’s telegram. The position of 
the officials there was one of caution an attitude that seemed to 
border on hostility to也eproposal. Sterndale Benett commented，“we 
cannot rule out the possi凶itythat a piecemeal settlement may merely 
give the Japanese a breathmg space But to get them really movmg in 
reverse would be a great gain for us”Ashley Clarke commented that“if 
the Kurusu suggestion is genuine，世田reseems to be some ground for a 
very cautious response on the part of the Amencans.”悶Inthe end, the 
British Government wrote to the American Administration expressing 
their pe田町ismabout Kurusu's proposals.“Japanese aim was to secure 
the speedy removal of economic p回目urebut not the speedy settlement 
of anything else ... Nevertheless, if Mr. Hull, who was m the best posi-
tion to Judge, thought a counter-proposal on a lirmted姐 dtemporary 
basis was good tactic, His Maiesty’s Government would give their sup-
port.”日
Before the British reply arrived泊Washington,Cordell Hull had drawn 
up a counter-propo田l,the essence of which was血atthe Japanese would 
withdraw由eirforces from southern Indo China and reduce the number 
of曲目rforces in northern Inda-China to 25,000. Furthermore, the 
United States would modify their freezing regulations, but this would be 
dictated by Japan’s willingr時間 tosettle the Sino-Japanese conflict“on 
the basis of law and order and jusl!ce.” 
The reaction of the Bntish Government, especially Wmston Churchill, 
was governed by the attitude of Chiang Kai-Shek to Hull’s pro po田I.
Chiang dubbed Hull’s proposals as a policy of appeasement vis-a－吋s
Japan; and though Churchill privately expressed his w1血 fora U.S.-
Japanese settlement m a minute to Eden on 23 November, the ferocious 
reaction of Chiang led him to change his conciliatory policy towards 
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Japan He wrote .to Roosevelt on 25 November，“.. it IS you to h阻 die
this business and we certainly do not want an addittonal war There 1s 
only one point that disquiets us. What about Chiang Kai Shek? Is he not 
having a thin dietヲOura田 ietyis about China. If they collapse, our 
jo担tdangers would enormously加crease.We are sure that he re伊rdof 
. the United States for the Chinese wil govern your action. We fel that 
the Japanese are most unsure of themselves ”回
Churchill’s reaction, together with China’s disavowal of Hull’s modus 
vivendi, convinced Hull that his plan was unpopular. He dropped his 
modus四vendz,and on 26 November, gave to Nomura his“comprehen-
s1ve basic propo田r’whichwas designed as reply to Kurusu's earlier 
proposal. In essence, 1t was a cal on Japan to renounce the basic pnn-
ciples of its aggressive policy泊 theFar East, and a recreation of吐10
Nine-Power Treaty. Cordell Hull thought les of his document and ob-
served that 1t would be unacceptable to Japan. He was right, for his 
document had no attraction for Kurusu 
The breakdown in negotiations undoubtedly hastened the Japanese 
attack on Pearl Harbour and Singapore on 7 December 1941. The crucial 
question to ask is whether Hull’s modus vivendi, if presented, would have 
saved吐iesituation in the Far East. Sir Robert Craigie白ltthat it would 
have ei也eraverted the war altoge也er,or helped Bntam to B田nmore 
t泊四面白eregion. He was convinced that had the United States and 
Bntam followed the earlier precedentsー theagreements relating to 
Tientsin, the use of Burma Road as a route for the supply of war ma-
terials to China Japan would not have attacked the British and吐ie
United States’po回目sions.
On the other hand，廿ieForeign Office attitude was influenced by the 
memory of the Munich Agreement -an agreement也atdid not provide 
a reassuring precedent It was believed there血atJapan was set on a 
course of exp四sionand that the modus阿vendz,if accepted by Cordell 
Hull, could not have prevented her from launching an attack on the 
British and the United States’possesS1ons“h也enot far dIStant future.” 
Records and secondary sources now reveal that Craigie was wrong, 
and the Foreign Office right. Christopher Thorne argues quite p町田a-
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sively血at“despite世田 extentto which it is possible to ar思見世田t
Was!血gtonpushed Tokyo into a comer, Japan’s momentum towards 
war was by then almost certainly too great to be checked.”回Undoubted-
ly, the Japanese Cabinet was disappointed by the reaction of the United 
Stat田 toKurusu's pl皿，indeedas one scholar nghtly remarked, despera-
tion led the cabinet to prefer war to世間continuationof stalemate h出e
negotiations." The fact吐田tthe naval 阻止 forcewhich eventually at-
tacked Pearl Harbour was asked to sail on 26 November from the Kurile 
Isl叩 ds畑tothe central Pacific may be a good evidence of their despera-
tlon at failure to get a settlement with the United States In fact, dec1・
sion to go to war was not made until I December 1941, and debates 
show that they were desperate.＇” 
However, It would be wrong to assume, as Crrugie did, that世田com-
pro mi曲目ormulaof 26 November，ぜac氾eptedby the United States and 
Japan, would have prevented war in East Asia. Such a conclusion ignores 
the fundamental po泊tthat也eJapanese leaders were bent on achieving 
certam national objectives in East As岨 duringthe 1930’s and early 
1940、whichwere incompatible with those of Brit瓜n岨 d世田United
States. Even if Japan’s national objectivesー liberationof Asm from 
the yoke of Western imperialism and the establi血mentof a Greater 
Co .Prosperity Sphere of Living in East Asia -were not entirely the 
product of conscious or deliberate decisions, the Japanese leaders were 
aw町eof世田町1plicationsof abandonmg世間m It would have meant, 
as Peter Duus pointed out，出eJapan田ewillingness to accept“national 
hurnilia ti on or由erole of a second rate power" in East Asia~＇ Neither 
was acceptable to most Japanese in 1941. It is世間eforedifficult to see, 
as Nish rightly asserts, how any Japanese cabinet could push世田ughthe 
sort of settlement to which the United States were likely to agree~＇ Thus, 
it is reasonable to conclude that the Foreign Office officials had a clearer 
加sightinto Japan’s policy than Robert Craigie日War,therefore, as世田
Foreign Office rightly assumed, was inevitable between Japan and the 
Democracies unless Britain and the United States were prepared to 
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